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CRASH AND LEARN: THE INABILITY OF TRANSPARENCY
LAWS TO PENETRATE AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY
Benjamin W. Cramer* and Martin E. Halstuk**
INTRODUCTION
With the fiftieth anniversary of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 2016,
advocates for greater transparency in the American government will contemplate
whether and how that statute and others like it have shed light on the deepest
decision-making processes of lawmakers and those who advise them. This Article
will apply the tradition of American government transparency (or lack thereof) to
the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), which as the nation’s central bank has a cru-
cial but little-understood influence on the state of the nation’s and the world’s econo-
mies. This became a matter of even greater public interest after the financial collapse
of 2007–2008, which sent the world economy into a stubborn and long-lasting
recession, and which may have been the indirect or even direct result of decisions
made at the Fed.1
Through a pattern of meetings behind closed doors and structural isolation from the
checks and balances process, the Fed receives very little public oversight of decision-
making processes that directly affect the people’s economic well-being. Who ac-
tually controls, owns, or oversees the Fed is a common question among government
watchdogs. If these questions prove difficult to answer, it follows that transparency
suffers when watchdogs are forced to ask further questions about an entity whose
very structure and place in the American government are cloaked in secrecy.
In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson, a critic of central banks who nonetheless
signed the bill that brought the Fed into existence, foreshadowed the problems that
could be caused by a secretive banking industry led by unaccountable insiders:
Since I entered politics, I have chiefly had men’s views
confided to me privately. Some of the biggest men in the United
States, in the field of commerce and manufacture, are afraid of
somebody, are afraid of something. They know that there is
a power somewhere so organized, so subtle, so watchful, so
* Senior Lecturer, College of Communications, Pennsylvania State University.
** Associate Professor, College of Communications, Pennsylvania State University.
1 See generally JOHN A. ALLISON, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FREE MARKET CURE:
WHY CAPITALISM IS THE WORLD ECONOMY’S ONLY HOPE 17–35 (2013) (attributing eco-
nomic instability that led to the financial crisis to the Fed); THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., MELTDOWN:
A FREE-MARKET LOOK AT WHY THE STOCK MARKET COLLAPSED, THE ECONOMY TANKED,
AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS WILL MAKE THINGS WORSE 63–86 (2009) (attributing boom-
and-bust cycles to actions taken by the Fed).
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interlocked, so complete, so pervasive, that they had better not
speak above their breath when they speak in condemnation of it.2
The myriad causes of the 2007–2008 financial crisis are beyond the scope of this
Article, though financial experts (in hindsight) have pointed to a combination of fac-
tors that are relevant for a discussion of transparency in monetary policy.3 Granted,
the private banking industry committed many transgressions of a structural nature,
such as predatory lending without sufficient government oversight, which encour-
aged banks to take on too much risk;4 increasingly complex securitization and
trading of other people’s assets, made possible by deregulation that reduced government
oversight;5 and a trend of mergers and buyouts that allowed financial institutions to
become larger and larger.6 Since the advent of the crisis, these have been reported
extensively in news articles and books.7
2 WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE GENER-
OUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 24 (William E. Leuchtenburg & Bernard Wishy eds., 1961).
3 See infra Part II.
4 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix, xxiii, 75–126 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
5 See id. at 38–51. A major legislative landmark, which reduced oversight of the institu-
tions that contributed to the financial crisis, was the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which
was a portion of the U.S. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). That statute was a direct reaction to the 1929 market
crash that led to the Great Depression, and it limited the interactions between consumer banks
and investment banks. FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 29, 32. Under political pressure from
large financial players who claimed that modern practices had made the 1933 restrictions ob-
solete, Glass-Steagall was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
That statute overturned many of the regulations of consumer and investment banks while re-
ducing regulatory oversight. This deregulation in particular allowed the industry to become much
more complex and dominated by larger and larger players that took on dangerous amounts of
risk while investing the deposits of their customers. See James Rickards, Repeal of Glass-
Steagall Caused the Financial Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: ECON. INTELLIGENCE BLOG
(Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/08/27
/repeal-of-glass-steagall-caused-the-financial-crisis [http://perma.cc/7KK8-N95L].
In the wake of the collapse, leading economists like Robert Weissman and Joseph Stiglitz
saw the repeal of Glass-Steagall as a major influence. Weissman claimed that the repeal en-
couraged consumer banks “to emulate Wall Street’s high-risk speculative betting approach.”
Robert Weissman, Reflections on Glass-Steagall and Maniacal Deregulation, COMMON DREAMS
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.commondreams.org/views/2009/11/12/reflections-glass-stea
gall-and-maniacal-deregulation [http://perma.cc/5YRE-BK52]. Stiglitz claimed that the repeal
changed the risk-averse culture of consumer banks and allowed them to adopt the high-risk
behavior of investment banks. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capitalist Fools, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2009,
at 48, 50.
6 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 4, at 52–66.
7 Prominent examples of books in which investigative journalists or financial experts
have explored the causes of the financial collapse from the regulatory standpoint include
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A much lesser-known influence on the events leading up to the financial col-
lapse was the internal decision-making process at the Fed, particularly in regard to
interest rates and money supplies.8 As will be described herein, the Fed is a quasi-
public independent agency within the Executive Branch with no direct oversight,
and reduced checks and balances from the other branches of the government.9 The
Fed is the primary instigator of adjustments in the American money supply, making
it the key mover in monetary policy and therefore the final approver of the amount
of money that flows into the banking system.
If anyone chooses to use FOIA10 or related transparency statutes to find information
on the state of the financial industry, they are likely to be thwarted by legal interpreta-
tions, agency structures, and case precedents that have been in place since before the
2007–2008 meltdown.11 Of particular interest is the fact that the American economy
is overseen by an unwieldy variety of quasi-public agencies and secretive advisory
committees, large categories of financial information are exempted from FOIA, and
banks have been known to claim that their proprietary financial instruments are trade
secrets.12 Since the financial crash, what have we learned? Not very much, and this
situation is unlikely to change due to the forces described in this Article.
The Article will argue that the Fed, thanks to its legislative structure, place within
the American government, and court precedents regarding transparency statutes, is in-
sulated from public oversight of almost all of its operations. The next Part introduces
the Fed’s history and structure. The following Part will discuss the role of transparency
and secrecy in the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The third Part will consider whether
two potentially powerful transparency statutes, the Freedom of Information Act and
the Federal Advisory Committee Act, can be used to reveal documents from the bank-
ing sector and its regulators, along with the relevant statutory and case histories of
those acts. The Article concludes with a discussion of the factors that have made the
Fed System, and its internal decision-making processes, particularly impenetrable
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009);
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010); NOMI PRINS,
IT TAKES A PILLAGE: BEHIND THE BAILOUTS, BONUSES, AND BACKROOM DEALS FROM
WASHINGTON TO WALL STREET (2009); and ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES (2009).
8 See ALLISON, supra note 1, at 17–36.
9 See infra notes 70–89 and accompanying text.
10 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
11 See Samuel L. Zimmerman, Note, Understanding Confidentiality: Program Effective-
ness and the Freedom of Information Act Exemption 4, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1087,
1092–96 (2012); see also Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 342–49 (1979)
(describing the Fed’s policy against disclosing certain monetary policy directives); Bloomberg,
L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 147–50 (2d Cir. 2010)
(describing the Fed Board’s legal arguments against disclosing loan information), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. 1303 (2011).
12 See infra Parts III.A–B.
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to citizens, journalists, and politicians who seek information on crucial matters of
monetary policy.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND
MODERN BANKING REGULATION
Financial regulation in the United States comes in many different categories, with
the combined goal of maintaining the integrity and stability of the economy.13 Many
different segments of the economy are regulated, from small banks to the trading of
stock issued by publicly owned corporations.14 Of particular interest in any analysis
of the 2007–2008 financial crisis is the regulation of large banks and firms that pro-
vide financial services and investment management.15 In addition to traditionally
structured regulatory agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission, there are
several unconventionally structured agencies in the United States government with
some sort of oversight of the economy and financial markets.16 The most important for
this Article’s arguments is the Fed,17 along with similarly unconventional entities like
the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or “Fannie Mae”)18 and the Fed-
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or “Freddie Mac”).19 Each of these
entities comes with specific transparency challenges, due to the complexity of their
operations, their quasi-public status, and their positions within the executive branch of
the American government.
This Article assumes that the techniques of modern American financial regulation
date back to the early twentieth century and the formation of the Fed. Since the coun-
try’s founding, periodic panics and other crises had beset the American economy,
culminating in the particularly severe Panic of 1907, in which many state and local
13 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 15–16 (9th ed. 2005).
14 See generally EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO REGU-
LATES WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL AND REGULATORY POLICY FOR
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS (2015) (providing a description of various regulatory
authorities across financial institutions).
15 While the exact causes of the financial crisis are many and varied, risky lending practices
by financial services firms, particularly in real estate and mortgage loans, were predominantly
cited in a speech by then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben S. Bernanke. Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Four Questions about the Financial Crisis, Speech at Morehouse
College (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090
414a.htm [http://perma.cc/4TAU-QNWT].
16 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence,
63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 607–23 (2010) (providing an overview of financial regulatory agencies).
17 The Fed will be the focus of much of this Article. Official information can be found
at BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/default.htm [https://
perma.cc/7QWJ-P98E].
18 See generally FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/ [http://perma.cc/Y3NQ-3EKV].
19 See generally FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/ [http://perma.cc/7BDQ-5EBB].
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banks went bankrupt after runs on their cash reserves.20 It was necessary for wealthy
financier J.P. Morgan to convince his peers to contribute large sums of their own
money to shore up the banking industry.21 At the time, the United States had no central
bank to manage the liquidity of local banks or to inject funds into the marketplace.22
Senator Nelson Aldrich chaired a congressional committee to investigate preventa-
tive solutions, leading to the establishment of the Fed as a central bank in 1913.23
It is important to note that the Federal Reserve Act, which authorized the new
central bank, was not written in Congress.24 Morgan invited a selection of powerful
financiers and agreeable politicians, including Senator Aldrich, to his private estate at
Jekyll Island, Georgia starting in late 1910 to construct the central bank and its statutory
mandate.25 Paul Warburg, then a director at Wells Fargo & Company, had written
widely on the need for banking reform after the Panic of 1907, and attracted the notice
of Senator Aldrich, who utilized him as a consultant.26 Warburg’s ideas and leadership
were particularly influential at Jekyll Island, and he was later tapped by Woodrow
Wilson as one of the first members of the Federal Reserve Board.27 The attendees at
Jekyll Island concocted what later became known as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.28
20 For coverage of the Panic of 1907 and its influence of later monetary policy, see generally
Bradley A. Hansen, A Failure of Regulation? Reinterpreting the Panic of 1907, 88 BUS.
HIST. REV. 545 (2014); Jon Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role
of Trust Companies, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 611 (1992); George E. Roberts, Lesson of the Panic,
25 BANKING L.J. 781 (1908).
21 See Banks and the Panic, 16 AM. LAW. 118 (1908); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed.
Reserve Sys., The Crisis as a Classic Financial Panic, Remarks at 14th Jacques Polak Annual
Research Conference (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20131108a.htm [http://perma.cc/UPT7-4BVU].
There have been some suggestions that Morgan and his peers caused the Panic of 1907
by spreading false rumors about the insolvency of small banks, which caused depositors to
withdraw their funds in a panic; the wealthy financiers then purportedly used the resulting
crisis to justify the creation of a central bank that would protect their business interests. See
generally G. EDWARD GRIFFIN, THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND: A SECOND LOOK AT
THE FEDERAL RESERVE 20–25 (5th ed. 2010).
22 Bernanke, supra note 21 (“In 1907 the United States had no central bank, so the avail-
ability of liquidity depended on the discretion of firms and private individuals, like Morgan.”).
23 William G. Dewald, The National Monetary Commission: A Look Back, 4 J. MONEY,
CREDIT, & BANKING 930, 931–35 (1972).
24 See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 451–69.
25 Michael A. Whitehouse, Paul Warburg’s Crusade to Establish a Central Bank in the
United States, REGION (May 1, 1989), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-re
gion/paul-warburgs-crusade-to-establish-a-central-bank-in-the-united-states [http://perma.cc
/4P29-KVP7].
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522); Whitehouse, supra note 25.
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The attendees at the 1910 powwow had made connections with Woodrow Wilson,
who was just beginning to campaign for the Presidential election of 1912.29 Wilson
was perturbed by the plans of the big bankers and made his opposition to their banking
reform efforts a cornerstone of his campaign.30 After Wilson became President,
Senator Aldrich introduced the Jekyll Island group’s legislation, proposing the
National Reserve Association to Congress.31 The Aldrich Plan faced strong opposi-
tion from both parties and was not voted on.32 A compromise bill proposed by Carter
Glass and Robert Latham Owen, which retained some of Aldrich’s original pro-
posal, passed both houses by comfortable margins.33 Wilson, perhaps fearing a veto
override, reluctantly signed the bill into law in December 1913.34
Woodrow Wilson’s ominous comments on this episode would inspire criticism
of the Fed up to the present day. In his memoirs, Wilson alluded to the cabal of
powerful bankers behind the Federal Reserve Act and surrounding events by stating:
“A great industrial nation is controlled by its system of credit. Our system of credit
is privately concentrated. The growth of the nation, therefore, and all our activities
are in the hands of a few men . . . .”35
[W]e have come to be one of the worst ruled, one of the most
completely controlled and dominated, governments in the civi-
lized world—no longer a government by free opinion, no longer
a government by conviction and the vote of the majority, but a
government by the opinion and the duress of small groups of
dominant men.36
It would be unwise to speculate on the true motivations of those small groups
of dominant men, but they certainly constructed a banking system that was more
stable than before, thanks to direct backing from the government. The Federal Re-
serve Act of 1913 established the central bank of the United States,37 set up a Board
29 GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 451–57.
30 Gregory D.L. Morris, The Secret Meeting That Launched the Federal Reserve: Echoes,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 15, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles
/2012-02-15/the-secret-meeting-that-launched-the-federal-reserve-echoes [http://perma.cc
/P2MM-R2SQ].
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.; see Roger Lowenstein, The Central Bank Skeptic Who Helped Give Birth to the
Fed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/business/dealbook
/the-central-bank-skeptic-who-helped-give-birth-to-the-fed.html.
34 Lowenstein, supra note 33.
35 WILSON, supra note 2, at 111–12.
36 Id. at 122.
37 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–52 (2012). Note that there had previously been some attempts at an
American central banking system, dating as far back as the establishment of the First National
Bank of the United States by Alexander Hamilton in 1791, but these were unsuccessful and
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of Governors to oversee the system,38 and initially mandated that body to manage
three monetary policy objectives: maximum employment, stable prices (via the
management of inflation and deflation), and stable long-term interest rates.39 The
Fed refers to itself as “an independent central bank because its [monetary policy]
decisions do not have to be ratified by the President or anyone else in the executive
branch of government.”40 “[I]t does not receive funding appropriated by the Con-
gress, and the terms of the members of the Board of Governors span multiple
presidential and congressional terms.”41 The central banking system consists of the
main Fed offices in Washington, D.C. and twelve regional Federal Reserve banks.42
A large number of local banks (slightly more than one third of the country’s
banks overall) are members of the Fed and report to the twelve regional offices,
which in turn give them federal backing for their operations.43
In passing the Federal Reserve Act, Congress agreed that a stable central bank
could alleviate cyclical crises by managing the money supply and regulating the pos-
sibly risky behavior of local banks.44 Accordingly, the Fed serves as the government’s
bank (via the Department of the Treasury) and as a bank for other banks.45 The Fed also
sells and redeems government-backed securities like savings bonds and treasury bills.46
The Fed often describes itself as “independent within the government,”47 explaining
that it does not receive funding from Congress but maintains an internal budget
funded mainly through the trading of government-backed securities.48 However, the
politically unpopular. See generally David J. Cohen, The First Bank of the United States and the
Securities Market Crash of 1792, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 1041 (2000); Bray Hammond, The Second
Bank of the United States, 43 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC. 80, 83–85 (1953).
38 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2012).
39 These mandates are included in the Fed’s own mission statement. See BD. OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 1.
40 Id. at 2–3.
41 Federal Reserve System: Who Owns the Federal Reserve?, FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND,
https://www.richmondfed.org/faqs/frs [https://perma.cc/3KZ4-8YFF]. Members of the Board of
Governors are appointed to staggered 14-year terms, purportedly to insulate individual Governors
and the Board itself from the political intrigues of shorter-lived Presidential administrations. Id.
at 4; Introduction to the Board of Governors, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://www.stlouis
fed.org/in-plain-english/federal-reserve-board-of-governors [http://perma.cc/H83A-6BRL].
42 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 3; see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 222 (2012).
43 This includes approximately 900 state banks and 5,000 bank holding companies. BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE. SYS., supra note 13, at 4–5, 12. Banks that are not members
of the Fed are supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which
primarily backs insurance plans to shield customer deposits from bank failures. Id. at 60–61.
44 Id. at 70, 83.
45 Id. at 97.
46 Id. at 99, 116.
47 Id. at 3.
48 Id. at 11.
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Fed admits that it is ultimately accountable to Congress and the people.49 Of particu-
lar interest for discussions of transparency at the Fed is a tacit congressional man-
date for the institution to achieve a balance between the private profit motives of the
banking system and the public interest responsibilities of the American government,
which can be achieved with pro-consumer regulations targeted at fair lending and
the like.50 This attempt at a balance is represented in the structure of the Fed: the
directors of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks are elected by the leaders of
the private banks in the respective regions (a private sector process),51 while the
members of the Board of Governors are nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate (a public sector process).52 Furthermore, the Fed distributes government-
backed public funds to its member banks, which are private for-profit institutions.53
The position of the Fed in the American economic and monetary structure is
unique in the world, in that the Fed is a central bank that does not create the cur-
rency that it is tasked with managing and stabilizing.54 Unlike in other countries, the
U.S. Dollar is created outside of the central bank, at the Department of the Treasury,
thus further separating the Fed’s operations from the executive branch of the govern-
ment.55 The Department of the Treasury actually manufactures the bills and coins
that make up U.S. currency, then sells them to the Fed at cost; the Fed then distrib-
utes the currency into the banking and financial network.56 Importantly, the amount
of money to be actually produced is determined by the Fed,57 with the Chairman of
49 What Does It Mean That the Federal Reserve Is ‘Independent Within the Government’?,
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about
_12799.htm [http://perma.cc/3D4X-HSN7].
50 See Charles I. Plosser, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., An Appreciation of the
Fed’s 12 Banks, Speech Before the Union League of Philadelphia (Feb. 17, 2015), https://
www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2015/02-17-15-union-league [http://
perma.cc/S55N-Q3N7].
51 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 10.
52 Id. at 4.
53 About thirty-eight percent of commercial banks are members of the Fed. Id. at 12.
54 U.S. FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE TODAY 28–30 (16th ed. 2012), https://
www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/education/federal_reserve_today
/frtoday.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV9M-TQMA].
55 Id.
56 Id.; How Currency Gets into Circulation, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (July 2013), https://
www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed01.html [http://perma.cc/NRM6-MCFZ].
57 How Currency Gets into Circulation, supra note 56. As of 2013, the most common
coins in circulation (pennies, nickels, dimes, and quarters) cost between about one cent and
nine cents each to produce, subject to fluctuations in mineral prices. Christopher Ingraham,
It Cost 1.7 Cents to Make a Penny This Year, and 8 Cents to Make a Nickel, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/15
/it-cost-1-7-cents-to-make-a-penny-this-year-and-8-cents-to-make-a-nickel/ [http://perma.cc
/JN83-2EJ3]. Bills, made out of inexpensive paper but with intricate designs to deter counter-
feiting, cost about four cents each. How Currency Gets into Circulation, supra note 56.
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the Fed meeting regularly with the Secretary of the Treasury to discuss matters of
the monetary supply.58 This is notable because decisions on the supply of money are
influenced by the goals and desires of the for-profit banks that inform the Fed lead-
ership on policy matters, and less so on budgetary or fiscal matters that are within
the bailiwick of the Department of the Treasury.59 The Fed also utilizes measurements
of the money supply—the rarely reported and little understood “M” measurements—as
part of overly complex determinations of monetary policy toward cash supplies,
bank reserves, control of inflation, and the like.60 This is one example of the very com-
plicated internal decision-making processes at the Fed, the sheer complexity of which
might deter citizens and journalists from knowing which questions to ask and which
might serve as a de facto style of secrecy.
The Fed’s original charter was largely premised on the need to prevent financial
panics, which were typically caused when citizens lost faith in the ability of banks
to protect their savings; people would withdraw their funds en masse (a “run” on the
banks), which would then eliminate the reserves that those same banks could use to
provide loans or otherwise invest in the economy.61 The Fed’s most prominent
regulatory tool for avoiding panics is to act as the “lender of last resort,” providing
federally backed funds to financial institutions that cannot obtain credit elsewhere
due to a lack of confidence.62 The Fed also mandates a reserve requirement, or the
percentage of customer deposits that must be available as hard cash.63 Another
powerful regulatory tool involves controlling the federal funds rate, which is the rate
of interest charged to banks that borrow funds from the Fed.64 This affects the supply
of money in the economy significantly.65 Furthermore, at the Fed’s discretion, poorly
58 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 5.
59 See id. at 15–25 (providing a detailed summary of the policy considerations the Fed
takes into account when regulating the money supply).
60 See id. at 21–22. These measurements include “M0” to represent extant physical currency,
“MB” for M0 plus Federal Reserve deposits, “M1” for M0 that is outside the private banking
system, “M2” for M1 plus savings accounts and money market funds, and several others of
increasing complexity. For an overview, see George T. McCandless Jr. & Warren E. Weber,
Some Monetary Facts, 19 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 2 (1995).
61 See generally John Bryant, A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance,
4 J. BANKING & FIN. 335 (1980); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs,
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (arguing that bank runs can
cause, and be a predictor of, economic downturns).
62 See generally Michael D. Bordo, The Lender of Last Resort: Alternative Views and
Historical Experience, 76 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV. 18 (1990) (discussing the
role of and differing views of the lender of last resort).
63 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2012); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra
note 13, at 41–44.
64 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 16–19.
65 The federal funds rate is not mentioned under that name in the Federal Reserve Act,
though the act does instruct the Fed to achieve “moderate long-term interest rates.” 12 U.S.C. 
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performing member banks can be expelled from the Fed unless they improve their
operations; expulsion can significantly impact such a bank’s ability to obtain funds
due to the loss of federal backing.66
The Fed’s responsibilities have expanded since its original charter in 1913, thanks
to amendments to the Federal Reserve Act and other legislative developments. Most of
these later developments increased the Fed’s authority to supervise and regulate the
American banking industry.67 Presently the Fed’s regulatory reach extends into the
daily operations of banks and bank holding companies that are members of the Fed.68
Some of the Fed’s regulations can be applied to all banks in the country, regardless of
their membership in the Fed; these typically involve enforcement of consumer pro-
tection laws targeted at lending practices and equal opportunities for credit.69
The Fed is a combined public/private (or “quasi-public”) agency within the
American government.70 It was indeed formed by law and the members of its Board
of Governors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.71 The
legislative branch can, and often does, call upon the Board of Governors to testify
on their higher-level monetary policy strategies and issues of banking and financial
regulation.72 The Fed also does not make a profit after paying for expenditures; it
§ 225a (2012); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at
16–19. Members of the Federal Open Market Committee, a body within the Fed made up of
a rotating cast of regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents plus the Chair of the Board of
Governors, meets approximately eight times each year to discuss adjusting the federal funds
rate. Id. at 11–12.
66 12 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
67 Some of the more noteworthy legislation includes the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, also
known as the Banking Act of 1933 (though it is actually a specific section of that act), Pub.
L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.);
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852 (2012); the Federal Reserve
Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387 (1977) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.); the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (re-
pealing portions of the Glass-Steagall Act); the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.);
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The
latter two of these were reactions to the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
68 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 4–5.
69 Id. at 59–76.
70 Id. at 10.
71 FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F.: DR. ECON, Is the Federal Reserve a Privately Owned
Corporation? (Sept. 2003), http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2003
/september/private-public-corporation/ [http://perma.cc/LQ69-GQYE]; Juliet Lapidos, Is the
Fed Private or Public?, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2008, 6:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/09/is_the_fed_private_or_public.html [http://perma.cc
/8KQV-283T]; see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 10.
72 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 5.
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hands the proceeds from its operations over to the Department of the Treasury.73 In
2014 this transfer of funds amounted to $97 billion.74 These are all indications of a
public institution. But on the other hand, the legislative and executive branches have
no direct oversight of the Fed’s daily decisions and it pays for its own operations
with a completely internal budget.75
The legal and governmental status of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks
raises many of the transparency concerns that are at the heart of this Article. While
the Fed’s Board of Governors is considered to be a government agency,76 the regional
Fed banks have been granted an intermediate legal status somewhere between public
and private, with some characteristics of federal agencies and others of private
corporations.77 Where the Federal Reserve Banks cross the line from public to pri-
vate is a confusing matter that has confounded the courts. The distinction arises
when courts try to decide which federal laws those banks should observe.
For example, in a case involving a tort claim against a regional Federal Reserve
Bank, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “the Reserve Banks are not federal instrumentali-
ties . . . but are independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations,”
while then noting rather contradictorily, “the Reserve Banks have properly been held
to be federal instrumentalities for some purposes.”78 The Ninth Circuit has defined the
concept thusly: “Many financial institutions are federally chartered and regulated and
are considered federal instrumentalities, without attaining the status of government
agencies within the meaning of federal procedural rules.”79 Furthermore, the same
court ruled that “an organization does not become a government agency simply
because it is federally chartered and regulated.”80 From this ruling, one is bound to
infer that the Federal Reserve Banks are used by the government as “instruments” to
73 Id. at 11.
74 Ben Leubsdorf, Fed Sent Nearly $97 Billion to the U.S. Treasury in 2014, WALL ST. J.:
REAL TIME ECON. (Mar. 20, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/20
/fed-sent-nearly-97-billion-to-the-u-s-treasury-in-2014/ [https://perma.cc/HJD3-FK8M].
75 See Lapidos, supra note 71.
76 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13, at 4.
77 Id. at 10. Compare Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
Federal Reserve Banks are not federal instrumentalities for purpose of the Federal Torts
Claims Act), and Ball v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 87 F. Supp. 3d 33, 55–56
(D.D.C. 2015) (holding that the Federal Reserve Bank is a financial institution under FOIA dis-
closure exemptions), with Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. v. Comm’r of Corp. & Taxation, 499
F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1974) (classifying a Federal Reserve Bank as federal instrumentality for pur-
poses of state tax exemption), and Lee Constr. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 558 F. Supp. 165, 179 (D.
Md. 1982) (holding that a Federal Reserve Bank was an agency under the Administrative
Procedures Act).
78 Lewis, 680 F.2d at 1241–42. This case was brought by a man who was hit by a car
owned by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Id. at 1239. In the belief that the bank
was a federal agency, he sued for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (2012). See id.
79 In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).
80 Id. (citing Fed. Land Bank v. Cotton, 410 F. Supp. 169, 171 (N.D. Ga. 1975)).
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achieve a goal, but are not parts of the government themselves.81 Of the most interest
for this Article’s arguments is the court’s legal definition of the banks: “Each Federal
Reserve Bank is a separate corporation owned by commercial banks in its region.”82
As will be discussed below, this conception of the structure of the Fed places it beyond
the reach of transparency statutes that are directed toward government agencies.83
In a case involving a civil rights claim against a regional Federal Reserve Bank, the
Eighth Circuit was compelled to draw a legal distinction between the regional Federal
Reserve Banks, which are private corporations created by the government in pursuit of
economic and monetary goals, and the Board of Governors, which is a Federal
agency.84 In this case, the government argued that Federal Reserve Banks are distinct
from the Board of Governors and are therefore not government agencies, because the
banks are not overseen by the government but by the private directors of the regional
Federal Reserve Banks.85 The government also argued that Federal Reserve Bank
employees should not be considered government employees.86 The court agreed that
“although the government may have a substantial interest in the operation of the
Federal Reserve Banks, it does not have a proprietary interest in them. We also con-
clude that the Bank is not a department, commission, administration, authority, or
bureau of the federal government.”87 Also, due to the limited interactions between
the Reserve Banks and the government, the fact that the banks “[do] not receive
government appropriations to operate,” and “are not listed as either wholly-owned
or mixed-ownership corporations under federal law,” then they are not federal
agencies.88 This is a crucial distinction when it comes to the Fed; the Board of Gover-
nors has been determined to be a federal agency, and that board does indeed release
some information to requesters, but the “corporate” segments of the Fed have thus
been insulated from the transparency rules that apply throughout the rest of the
executive branch.89
81 The term “instrumentality” appears in several court rulings and statutes but a precise
judicial or statutory definition is typically absent, perhaps turning the term into a self-fulfilling
prophecy. For example, the section of the United States Code that established the Farm
Credit Administration decrees that this organization “shall become as of such date a federally
chartered body corporate and an instrumentality of the United States” but with no definition
of instrumentality or citation to any other regulation that may have one. 12 U.S.C. §
2091(b)(4) (1988). Black’s Law Dictionary does not have a precise definition for the term
“instrumentality,” but defines “means” as “the instrument or agency through which an end
or purpose is accomplished.” What is MEANS?, Law Dictionary, http://thelawdictionary.org
/means/ [https://perma.cc/MSZ3-SYAY] (featuring Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online Legal
Dictionary 2d ed.).
82 Lewis, 680 F.2d at 1241.
83 See infra Part II.
84 See generally Scott v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, 406 F.3d 532 (8th Cir. 2005).
85 Id. at 534.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 536.
88 Id. at 536–37.
89 See id.
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Some American financial regulation is under the purview of other agencies that
further exhibit the challenges of quasi-public status. Congress has established several
Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) to purportedly stabilize the commercial
banking industry from periodic shocks, the two most prominent of which are Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.90 A GSE is a private corporation that was chartered by the
government to enhance the flow of credit to certain segments of the economy, such
as the mortgage market, while providing a government-enforced guarantee against
excessive losses or failure.91 This places even more federal decision-making processes
involving the economy out of reach of executive branch transparency rules. This is
particularly troubling for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are significantly
involved in the mortgage marketplace, the unscrupulous risk-taking of which was
a primary cause of the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
This conception of the Fed as a governmental operation that is not quite part of the
government has many critics. G. Edward Griffin, author of a book about the writing
of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, argues that the Fed is a private banking cartel
and not a government organization.92 The Fed’s top leadership, the Board of Gover-
nors, has typically been populated by former academics with advanced degrees in
economics who exhibit the qualities of long-time public servants.93 The presidents
of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, with a few exceptions, are also former
academics with long careers in public service.94 But these regional officials are ap-
pointed by boards of directors that are made up almost entirely of officials from the
member banks in the respective districts; many of these are actual bankers or are
selected by the bank officers.95 These boards then supervise the operations of the
respective regional Federal Reserve Banks, approving budgets and expenditures.96
90 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov
/SupervisionRegulation/FannieMaeandFreddieMac/Pages/About-Fannie-Mae---Freddie
-Mac.aspx [http://perma.cc/P6A4-UH4M].
91 See generally Harold Seidman, Thomas H. Stanton & G. Thomas Woodward, Govern-
ment Sponsored Enterprises, 9 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 76 (1989).
92 See generally GRIFFIN, supra note 21, quoted in ETHOS (independent film, 2011).
93 The careers of the last two Chairs of the Fed are indicative of this pattern. Janet Yellen
(Chair from 2014 to present) started as an economics professor at Harvard University and the
London School of Economics before joining the Fed as an economist; Ben Bernanke (Chair from
2006 to 2014) followed a similar path via Stanford, New York, and Princeton Universities; Cur-
rent Vice-Chair Stanley Fischer (2014 to present) taught economics at the University of Chicago
and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Members of the Board, BOARD GOVERNORS
FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/default.htm [https://perma.cc
/DA9L-7E8N].
94 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Federal Reserve Bank Presidents,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/banks/default.htm [http://perma.cc/3JBC
-79GY] (last updated Feb. 2, 2016).
95 See The Structure of the Federal Reserve System: Board of Directors, BOARD GOV-
ERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri4.htm [https://
perma.cc/XD82-95KY].
96 Id.
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By law, in return for the benefits of membership in the Fed, the member banks
are required to buy stock in the regional Federal Reserve Banks, thus giving them
certain types of shareholder authority over Fed operations and an interest in the
system’s short-term profitability.97 Critics have often focused on “ownership,” as in
private bankers owning the Fed through the stock that they are required by law to
purchase.98 The Fed appears to take this critique seriously, stating on its website that
it “is not ‘owned’ by anyone and is not a private, profit-making institution.”99 Be that
as it may, private banks, which have an obvious profit motive, have a large amount of
influence over the operations of the national central bank that was purportedly created
to keep them solvent.100 In a further indication of private industry influence, a group
called the Federal Advisory Council, consisting of twelve representatives from the
banking industry selected by the respective regional Federal Reserve Banks, regularly
advises the Fed’s Board of Governors.101 As will be discussed below, the minutes of
such meetings are proactively disclosed by the Fed, but only since 2011 after political
pressure for more openness.102
The quasi-public structure and profit motive of the members of the Fed has re-
duced the efficacy of traditional American transparency rules, making necessary the
piecemeal and largely ineffective legislative efforts described in the next section.103
II. TRANSPARENCY AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Of interest in the discussion of the openness of the financial sector are specific
privacy and transparency statutes. Prior to 1978, the U.S. government was not re-
quired to tell bank customers that it could inspect their banking records, and the
customers had no procedure for preventing record collection.104 In United States v.
Miller,105 the Supreme Court ruled that banking records belong to the institution
(who can then hand them over to the government), rather than to the customer.106
This inspired the passage of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, which reacted
97 Brooks Jackson, Federal Reserve Bank Ownership, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 31, 2008),
http://www.factcheck.org/2008/03/federal-reserve-bank-ownership/ [http://perma.cc/Z6Q7
-X5TP].
98 Id.
99 Who Owns the Federal Reserve?, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www
.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.htm [http://perma.cc/2PP6-RKLE] (last updated Aug. 25,
2016).
100 See Federal Advisory Council, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federal
reserve.gov/aboutthefed/fac.htm [http://perma.cc/63XW-3GRM] (last updated May 19, 2016).
101 Id.
102 The documents can be downloaded from Federal Advisory Council, supra note 100.
103 See infra Part II.
104 Right to Financial Privacy Act, ACCESS REP., http://www.accessreports.com/statutes
/RFPA.htm [http://perma.cc/86CJ-5V6M].
105 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
106 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43.
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to the Supreme Court ruling by giving customers of financial institutions an interme-
diate level of privacy against government searches, with advance notice required.107
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, while not preventing secrecy in the eyes of custom-
ers, requires reports from financial institutions to the government for investigations
into financial crimes like money laundering and tax evasion.108 It is important to note
that these federally mandated reports are exempt from disclosure to citizens under
the FOIA.109 These statutes are directed at any government agency that oversees bank-
ing records, including the Fed for its member banks,110 but there have not yet been
enough cases for judicial review in determining the extent to which the statutes can
shed light on the Fed’s operations.
Since 1978, the Fed in particular has been subjected to specific accountability
rules, with the Federal Banking Agency Audit Act enabling the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to audit the Fed’s handling of some limited operations
like check processing and currency supply management, plus some of the Fed’s
regulatory activities toward consumer banks.111 However, the Act forbade the GAO
from auditing some important Fed activities, including transactions with foreign
governments and their central banks, and internal deliberations and decisions on
monetary policy.112 This is a crucial loophole in the transparency of the Fed for
which there is no justification given in the statutory language. It is perhaps inspired
by the perennial belief that unfavorable information about the banking system can
cause a panic when it gets into the public’s hands,113 but in any case the public has
been deprived of this information and has not been told why.
107 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422).
The USA PATRIOT Act amended the RFPA to exempt information deemed relevant
to national security investigations. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272,
358 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
108 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (1970) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
109 This is because the Bank Secrecy Act states that many types of documents and dis-
closures can remain confidential. Therefore, these materials cannot be obtained via the FOIA,
Exemption 3, which states that “[i]nformation that is prohibited from disclosure by another
Federal law” can be withheld. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 15.107 (2015).
110 In particular, the Fed has published a lengthy document on its responsibilities under
the Right to Financial Privacy Act. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK: RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT (2006).
111 31 U.S.C. § 714 (2012).
112 Id.; see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-96-159, FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES REQUIRE SYSTEMWIDE ATTENTION 1 n.2
(1996). Note that the current Government Accountability Office was formerly known as the
General Accounting Office. See also Sudeep Reddy, What Would a Federal Reserve Audit
Show?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2009, 9:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/08/31
/what-would-a-federal-reserve-audit-show/tab/article/ [https://perma.cc/BG68-6LP6].
113 This is the primary rationale for Exemption 8 of the FOIA, as will be discussed exten-
sively infra Part III.B.
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The Fed’s role in the subprime mortgage crisis and other trends that led to the
2007–2008 financial collapse, and whether it could have done anything to avoid
them, are matters of great dispute that are beyond the scope of this Article and will
probably be analyzed by experts for years. In any case, critics have generally noted
that the Fed’s powers and authority over the banking and financial sectors were
increasing in the years leading up to the crisis.114 During that period the Fed’s focus
on low interest rates exacerbated the risks being taken in the mortgage markets; the
Fed also intervened heavily in bond markets during that period and endeavored to
become a high-return, risk-taking investor of the federally backed funds and securi-
ties under its purview.115 In early 2008, former Fed Chair Paul Volcker lambasted
his successors, stating that the Fed had “take[n] actions that extend to the very edge
of its lawful and implied powers, transcending certain long-embedded central
banking principles and practices,” while “sweeping powers have been exercised in
a manner that is neither natural nor comfortable for a central bank.”116
Even before the actual financial collapse, European economists had noted that
the Fed’s non-transparent decisions about interest rates and the monetary supply
amounted, de facto, to false economic information for consumers and lenders,
leading to uncertainty that in turn led to booms followed by busts in several finan-
cial marketplaces.117 This was an important early critique of the Fed’s lack of
transparency. Meanwhile, in a congressional hearing on the worsening economy in
early 2007, just months before the financial meltdown, Representative Ron Paul (R-
KY) stated that “[c]ongress, in essence, has ceded total control of the value of our
money to a secretive central bank.”118 Paul continued: “Congress knows nothing of
the conversations, the plans, and the action taken in concert with other central banks.”119
The structural secrecy that has shielded the Fed from public oversight, as discussed
throughout this Article, was thus noticed directly by a concerned Congressman.
The only significant effort to learn about the Fed’s transparency practices leading
up to the financial collapse was by the financial media firm, Bloomberg. Shortly after
114 See James McBride & Mohammed Aly Sergie, The Role of the U.S. Federal Reserve,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/role-us-federal-reserve
/p21020 [http://perma.cc/KMX5-99SU] (last updated Dec. 17, 2015).
115 See id.
116 See Peter Coy, Volcker Shuns the Blame Game, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2008, 5:28 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-04-10/volcker-shuns-the-blame-gamebusiness
week-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice [http://perma.cc/Q4YG-3XQG].
117 See Matt Kibbe, The Federal Reserve Deserves Blame for the Financial Crisis,
FORBES (June 7, 2011, 3:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mattkibbe/2011/06/07/the
-federal-reserve-deserves-blame-for-the-financial-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/G7BE-5H3X].
118 Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy, Part I: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 110th Cong. 6 (2007) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs.).
119 Id.
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the collapse of several large banks and financial firms in Fall 2008, Bloomberg fur-
nished a FOIA request for information on who exactly was receiving the hundreds
of billions of dollars of stimulus funding in the government’s recently commenced
efforts to shore up and bail out the banks.120 Perhaps perceiving a need to prevent
a (bigger) financial panic, early in the process the Fed actually concealed the recipients
of the funds.121 While this was the largest distribution of funds by the Fed in its history,
traditionally the Fed had never precisely revealed all the recipients of its funds.122
In reaction to the Bloomberg FOIA request, the Fed claimed that the records could
remain undisclosed under FOIA Exemptions 4 and 5.123 Bloomberg made no challenge
to Exemption 5, so the trade secrets–related Exemption 4 was the focus of the District
Court’s analysis.124 The Fed claimed that the requested records were “confidential”
under Exemption 4 because they could damage the business operations of the banks dis-
cussed, and that Exemption 4 allows withholding of documents furnished by a “person”
at the company in question.125 The District Court rejected both of these arguments,
ruling that the information was completely internal to the Fed’s Board of Governors as
a federal agency, and had not been obtained from the banks, which is necessary for
Exemption 4 to apply.126 Meanwhile, the documents had been built upon information
obtained from the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, which did not qualify as
“persons” under the statute.127
The Fed unsuccessfully appealed this ruling.128 While the case was in progress,
journalists had been able to uncover some particularly noteworthy bailout opera-
tions, such as that for the American Insurance Group,129 but a full list of recipients
120 Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262,
267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 601 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010).
121 Id. at 266–67.
122 See Mark Pittman, Bloomberg Sues Fed to Force Disclosure of Collateral, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 7, 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20111124220023/http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akr.0Y2Ykc2g (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
123 Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 269. Note that FOIA Exemption 4 will be discussed in
detail infra Part III.A. Exemption 4 concerns the withholding of trade secrets information
that has been obtained from businesses, and Exemption 5 concerns the withholding of
privileged communications within agencies. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(4)–(5) (2012).
124 Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 280–81.
125 Id. at 277–78.
126 Id. at 278.
127 Id. at 276–82.
128 In September of 2009, the Fed appealed to the Second Circuit, and while doing so
obtained a stay on the order to disclose the documents. The Second Circuit upheld the lower
court’s ruling. Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143 (2d
Cir. 2010), aff’g 649 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1303 (2011).
129 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed’s
$85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/09/17/business/17insure.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all; Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah
Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout;
212 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:195
and total amounts awarded was not revealed until Bloomberg gained a favorable
ruling in its suit.130 The Fed finally released the records in early 2011, after the
Supreme Court rejected a banking group’s attempt to keep the documents secret.131
The banking group’s reasons for favoring secrecy cannot be found in the public
record, but this episode illustrates that the entities overseen by the Fed do not want
the public to know about their internal operations or the influence that they have on
the Fed leadership.
In the meantime, the Fed’s information disclosure responsibilities for pre-
existing documents were greatly expanded in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.132
Congress was slowly progressing on this idea in other ways as well. The financial
crisis inspired calls for increased transparency at the Fed and oversight by other
agencies.133 The self-explanatory Federal Reserve Transparency Act, originally
introduced in 2009 as a response to the crisis, has been reintroduced several times
(usually under the impetus of Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) and Representative Thomas
Massie (R-KY)), but has not yet survived the Senate.134 The leadership of the Fed
has criticized the idea of greater transparency and accountability within its opera-
tions, with current Chair Janet Yellen claiming that the Fed’s long-term economic
and monetary strategies would be subjected to short-term political influence.135
Perhaps in response to the political pressure, since 2012 the Fed has proactively
published quarterly financial reports for the regional Federal Reserve Banks as an
Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905 [http://perma.cc/6FLW-UYSU].
130 See generally Bloomberg, 601 F.3d 143.
131 See Craig Torres, Fed Releases Discount-Window Loan Records Under Court Order,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2011, 11:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03
-31/federal-reserve-releases-discount-window-loan-records-under-court-order [http://perma
.cc/FX9Q-3RP6]. The Clearing House Association, acting on behalf of the American Bankers
Association, took the appeal to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Clearing House
Ass’n L.L.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., 562 U.S. 1303 (2011).
132 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
133 See, e.g., MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R42079, FEDERAL RESERVE:
OVERSIGHT AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES (Dec. 1, 2016); About Audit the Fed, CAMPAIGN FOR
LIBERTY, http://www.campaignforliberty.org/audit-fed/ [http://perma.cc/6L5G-U96U].
134 For the act’s current status, see H.R. 24—Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2015,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/24 [https://perma
.cc/QUD6-9S9Z].
135 See Chris Matthews, ‘Audit the Fed’ is About Power, Not Transparency, FORTUNE
(Feb. 24, 2015, 3:18 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/02/24/federal-reserve-janet-yellen-audit
/?iid=sr-link1 [https://perma.cc/XYU8-H6UG]; Jordan Weissman, How Rand Paul’s Cru-
sade to Audit the Fed Could Make His Worst Nightmares Come True, SLATE: MONEYBOX
(Feb. 24, 2015, 7:16 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/02/24/the_absurdity
_of_rand_paul_s_quest_to_audit_the_fed_if_he_succeeds_it_will.html [http://perma.cc/R2E5
-SUG3].
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expansion of its previously mandated reporting practices, in which it has tradition-
ally released its own corporate-style annual financial statements.136
A recent event further illustrates the perils of secrecy in the federal banking
system. Several former Obama administration officials, who were in office during
the 2007–2008 crisis, have since moved on to management roles in large financial
firms of the type that contributed to the crisis.137 Leaders of the big banks have been
meeting behind closed doors to achieve a long-time goal of the American financial
industry—the elimination of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as GSEs, which would
then free up more of the proceeds of the nearly six trillion dollars home loan
market.138 In effect, private banks would like to remove these government-backed
institutions as competitors. In the words of the New York Times, “a revolving door
between Washington and Wall Street” has created a pattern of influence in which
banking leaders can make their regulatory wishes heard at the White House.139
White House officials reportedly met directly with Michael D. Berman and David
H. Stevens, both formerly high-ranking officials in the Department of Housing and
Urban Development and now leading lobbyists for the private mortgage industry.140
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to be bailed out in the midst of the financial
crisis, because they had attempted to increase profits by reducing the cash reserves
they had on hand to cover customers who had trouble repaying their mortgage
loans.141 When more and more of their customers had that exact same problem
during the subprime mortgage crisis, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac found themselves
unable to carry out their mandated missions, requiring a taxpayer-funded bailout.142
In a pattern similar to that after the Panic of 1907, bankers used Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac’s apparent insolvency to push for privatization; industry lobbyists with
ties in Washington have commenced meeting with the President and banking
regulators behind closed doors.143
136 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Aug. 27, 2012), http:
//www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20120827a.htm [https://perma.cc/THP2
-2JHH]. The reports can be downloaded from Federal Reserve System Financial Reports,
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_fed
financials.htm [http://perma.cc/667W-D26M] (last updated Aug. 23, 2016).
137 See Gretchen Morgenson, A Revolving Door Helps Big Banks’ Quiet Campaign to Muscle
Out Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/busi
ness/a-revolving-door-helps-big-banks-quiet-campaign-to-muscle-out-fannie-and-freddie.html.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See Charles Duhigg, Stephen Labaton & Andrew Ross Sorkin, As Crisis Grew, a Few
Options Shrank to One, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08
/business/08takeover.html.
142 As Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed
under conservatorship by the Department of the Treasury. See id.
143 See Morgenson, supra note 137.
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One can wonder if the nation’s potentially powerful document disclosure and pub-
lic participation statutes, the FOIA and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),
can be utilized by citizen watchdogs or journalists to penetrate the quasi-public
agencies that dictate monetary policy. As will be discussed in the next Part, court
precedents on other matters have weakened the possibilities of using these statutes
to obtain information from a quasi-public entity like the Fed.
III. MONETARY POLICY AND TRANSPARENCY LAW
The Fed’s leadership is unelected and independent, which in itself is not neces-
sarily unusual within the American government. “Independent” regulatory agencies
like the Federal Communications Commission do not need direct supervision from
the executive branch, but they must still report to the President regularly while being
checked by the legislative branch (often via budget cuts) or the judicial branch
during the judicial review process.144 As another example, the Supreme Court is a
powerful and influential body that is made up of unelected leaders who do not have
to report regularly to the other branches of the government, but it is still constrained
by the rule of precedent, not to mention by the basic checks and balances process as
mandated in the Constitution.145 On the other hand, the Fed is almost entirely detached
from the checks and balances process, operating independently of the executive branch,
and its quasi-public status has insulated it from many transparency requirements. This
makes the Fed’s operations inherently anti-democratic, and largely impenetrable via
the country’s existing transparency statutes.
This Part of the Article discusses two federal transparency statutes that could be
utilized for greater oversight of the Fed, the well-known and heavily adjudicated
FOIA,146 and the more obscure and easily evaded FACA.147 It is crucial to note that
the Fed has a FOIA compliance office and some types of documents can be obtained
on the Board of Governors’ website,148 though as discussed above, many categories
144 See David H. Davis, The Structure of Government Agencies, UNIV. TOLEDO, http://www
.utoledo.edu/llss/pspa/faculty/DAVIS/structure.htm [http://perma.cc/CV8X-D2DD] (last up-
dated June 30, 2016).
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
146 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). For a comprehensive resource on
the FOIA, see generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
(2009 ed.), https://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-freedom-information-act-0 [https://perma
.cc/PB5H-C7LA]. This publication is the Department of Justice’s official 1,000-page guide
explaining the provisions of FOIA and a summary of relevant case law. See also JAMES T.
O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE (3d ed. 2009). This is O’Reilly’s exhaustive,
two-volume, 2,000-page treatise, and a leading non-government legal practice guide for
litigation under FOIA.
147 Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15).
148 See supra note 136.
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of information have been exempted.149 This decreases the ability of journalists and
citizen watchdogs to provide oversight of the Fed through the document disclosure
process.
A. FOIA Exemption 4: Legislative History and Court Rulings
Recall from the above discussion of the Bloomberg FOIA dispute that the Fed
has claimed FOIA Exemption 4, which protects trade secrets information furnished
by businesses,150 as a reason to withhold requested documents.151 The financial
industry regularly claims that its investment tools, such as customized credit default
swaps and derivative trading techniques, as well as business plans and strategies for
increasing deposits and investments from their customers, are trade secrets that
should be protected from disclosure by the government agencies that require the
filing of pertinent documents.152 The industry is usually allowed to self-report on
which practices and documents are “privileged” or “confidential.”153 Banks often
require their employees to sign non-disclosure agreements to keep internal opera-
tions secret from competitors,154 and the industry has lobbied Congress for new
statutory protection of such secrets.155 The industry’s obsession with trade secrets
has reached absurd proportions; in a recent effort by some of the largest banks in-
volved in the financial crisis (Citigroup and J.P. Morgan) to prevent insurance
companies from investigating why several of their employees committed suicide in
the wake of the crisis, lest crucial internal policy documents be revealed.156
149 See supra Part II.
150 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012).
151 See supra notes 120–28 and accompanying text.
152 There has been very little published research on the forms that these trade secrets take,
because of the shortage of information from companies that would like to keep them secret.
For an exemplary story of industry efforts to prevent their own customers from under-
standing their business models, see Neil Weinberg & Darrell Preston, 7 Ways Private Equity
is Gaming Your Pension, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2015-03-23/7-ways-private-equity-is-gaming-your-pension [http://perma
.cc/FUX3-7AMU] (last updated March 24, 2015).
153 In addition to Exemption 4 of the FOIA, which applies to the world of business in
general, there are also specific federal regulations for financial trade secrets. See 36 C.F.R.
§ 902.54 (2012).
154 See, e.g., Maria Bruno-Britz, Banks’ Intellectual Property at Great Risk Amid Layoffs,
BANK SYS. & TECH. (Jan. 13, 2009, 5:00 PM), http://www.banktech.com/banks-intellectual
-property-at-great-risk-amid-layoffs/d/d-id/1292548? [http://perma.cc/HD8Q-49PD].
155 See David Post, A Misguided Attempt to “Defend Trade Secrets,” WASH. POST (Dec. 2,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/and-we
-need-stronger-protection-for-trade-secrets-because/ [http://perma.cc/9C4H-LWEG].
156 See Insurance Policies Pertaining to Bankers’ Suicides Classified as Containing
‘Trade Secrets,’ RT (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:09 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/155712-martens
-policies-deaths-jpmorgan [http://perma.cc/GW53-RC4R]; Pam Martens & Russ Martens,
Suspicious Deaths of Bankers Are Now Classified as “Trade Secrets,” GLOBAL RES. (Apr. 29,
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The judicial history of FOIA Exemption 4 is likely to encourage the Fed to
claim that trade secrets protection can justify the withholding of information re-
ceived from its member banks, or internal information about those banks, as it already
has in the Bloomberg lawsuit.157 Litigation concerning Exemption 4 raises two
important questions. First, is a government agency justified in withholding informa-
tion that has been submitted voluntarily by the private companies it regulates?
Second, can citizens effectively understand industries and business operations that
have an impact on the public interest, while the companies or the government agencies
that regulate them keep that information secret?
The original rationale for protecting trade secrets was distinctly pro-business.158
For various regulatory purposes like oversight of labor relations, tax payments,
environmental compliance, and many others, businesses have to furnish documents
and reports to government agencies. But companies should not have to worry about
their competitors using FOIA to get a hold of such documents, which could very
well contain information about proprietary technology or strategic business plans.159
Starting in the late 1960s, several cases were brought to court involving disputes
over agency use of FOIA Exemption 4, though at first the basic meaning of the
exemption was rarely a matter under consideration.160
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet heard a case in which the definitions or
parameters of FOIA Exemption 4 were in dispute. The District of Columbia Circuit,
where many disputes with federal government agencies are litigated, has formed
most of the precedents for determining whether the trade secrets exemption has been
used properly or improperly by a government agency.161 Legal scholars have
2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/suspicious-deaths-of-bankers-are-now-classified-as-trade
-secrets/5379644 [http://perma.cc/GW53-RC4R].
157 Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 262, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 601 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010).
158 See Charles N. Davis, A Dangerous Precedent: The Influence of Critical Mass III on Ex-
emption 4 of the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 183, 184–85 (2000).
159 See id. at 188. Note that trade secrets law, a segment of intellectual property law, contains
its own mechanisms for protecting innovators from theft of their trade secrets by competitors.
This body of law applies primarily to interactions between businesses, while the trade secrets
exemption to the FOIA is only relevant in matters of government disclosure of information that
businesses have submitted to agencies. See Kurt M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade
Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 209, 215–28 (2006). See generally Jonathan R.
Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1269 (2004).
160 See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC,
450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425
F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
161 See generally Freedom of Information Act Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (July 23, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption
-4 [http://perma.cc/D7JP-DUMM].
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concluded that there are two crucial Circuit Court precedents on the statutory
intentions of Exemption 4: the National Parks decision of 1974162 and the Critical
Mass decision of 1992.163
National Parks was the first noteworthy case in which the true meaning and
ramifications of the trade secrets exemption were contested. An environmental
advocacy group disagreed with a refusal by the Department of the Interior, via FOIA
Exemption 4, to disclose licensing documents related to concession stands at national
parks by claiming that the requested files were “confidential.”164 The court lamented
the lack of definition for the word “confidential” in Exemption 4,165 and formulated
what became known as the National Parks test for the applicability of that term:
[A] commercial or financial matter is “confidential” for purposes
of the exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to
have either of the following effects: (1) to impair the Govern-
ment’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or
(2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained.166
This test became the norm for Exemption 4 cases throughout the federal courts, and
was applied without significant controversy for the next two decades.167
The court in National Parks also added an important distinction to the meaning
of “trade secret” by quoting the original Senate debates leading to the passage of
FOIA: “This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of information
which is obtained by the Government through questionnaires or other inquiries, but
which would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it
was obtained.”168 In other words, when a party submits information voluntarily to a
government agency, it is not automatically assumed that the agency should release that
information to the public (including business competitors) just because it was origi-
nally submitted without direct compulsion from the government.169 This distinction
162 Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
163 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC (Critical Mass III), 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993).
164 Nat’l Parks, 498 F.2d at 766.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 770.
167 See, e.g., Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 872 (stating that the court reaffirmed the two-
part test established in National Parks).
168 Nat’l Parks, 498 F.2d at 766 (quoting 111 CONG. REC. S26820, at 26823 (daily ed.
Oct. 13, 1965)). Here the court cited earlier cases that in turn cited this quotation from the
Senate debates. See Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580
n.6, 582 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 450 F.2d 698, 709
(D.C. Cir. 1970). Those cases involved agency withholding of information under FOIA
Exemption 4, though the text of the exemption was not a matter under consideration.
169 Nat’l Parks, 498 F.2d at 766–67.
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effectively reinforced the rights of parties that are compelled (though not forcefully
required) to provide information to government agencies170—and this focus on vol-
untary information would later cause a schism in Exemption 4 jurisprudence.171
The difference between voluntarily and involuntarily submitted information be-
came a matter of dispute in the Critical Mass case of 1992, in which the D.C. Circuit
Court abruptly formulated a new test to distinguish between these two categories of
government-held information, but possibly opened the door for over-reporting of
“voluntary” claims.172 The court dispute was brought by a citizens’ group known as
the Critical Mass Energy Project, which contested an Exemption 4 withholding by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).173 The documents in question were
provided voluntarily by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, a consortium
representing companies regulated by the NRC.174 The NRC denied the FOIA re-
quest;175 in the resulting court challenge the District Court upheld the denial under
the National Parks test for confidentiality.176 After multiple appeals and remands,177
170 Id. at 769.
171 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 158, at 190–91.
172 Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 879. This case is known informally as “Critical Mass III”
due to multiple appeals, remands, and summary judgments all related to the same FOIA
denial by the NRC. The Critical Mass Energy Project was a now-defunct effort undertaken
by Public Citizen, the consumer rights group founded by Ralph Nader. The project sought
to increase the transparency of government licensing of nuclear power plants. Public Citizen
still opposes unfettered construction of nuclear power plants, but now does so under an
endeavor to promote sustainable energy. See Stopping the Nuclear Relapse, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=570 [http://perma.cc/Q3ZF-BR9A].
173 Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 871.
174 Id. at 874.
175 Id.
176 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 644 F. Supp. 344, 346–47 (D.D.C. 1986),
vacated, 830 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated en banc, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
177 Critical Mass’s refusal to accept the FOIA denial by the NRC resulted in an extended
cycle of litigation. In the first appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the district court’s
judgment was a proper application of the National Parks test. Critical Mass Energy Project
v. NRC, 830 F.2d 278, 281–82 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated en banc, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1992). However, the court also ruled that the NRC had not fully proven that the information
in question was submitted voluntarily, and remanded the case for further findings on that matter.
Id. After remand, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district
court granted because the defendants had shown sufficiently that disclosing the requested
information would harm the government’s interest in efficiently licensing nuclear power
facilities. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 731 F. Supp. 554, 557 (D.D.C. 1990). This
ruling was then appealed by Critical Mass, at which time the appeals court remanded the case
again for further findings on the effects of disclosure on the quality of INPO reports. Critical
Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 931 F.2d 939, 947 (D.C. Cir.), vacated per curiam and reh’g
en banc granted, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991). This ruling inspired petitions from the
defendants to vacate, which were granted by the Circuit Court. Critical Mass Energy Project
v. NRC, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991). After this ruling, the court resolved to reexamine all
the previous decisions and reconsider the definition of “confidential” under the National
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the D.C. Circuit Court agreed to rehear the facts of the case and reconsider whether the
National Parks test was appropriate for voluntarily submitted information, choosing
to “correct some misunderstandings as to [the] scope and application” of the test.178
In the 1992 appeal, the circuit court formulated a distinction between voluntary
and involuntary submissions of data and reports to government agencies.179 In
situations in which information is furnished voluntarily, the government interest is
the continued availability of data.180 On the other hand, for involuntary submissions
the government interest is the continued reliability of the data.181 This distinction
between availability and reliability is not found in the National Parks test.182 In turn,
that test of the meaning of “confidential” under FOIA Exemption 4 was found to be
workable only for data furnished to the government involuntarily.183 The court then
determined that voluntarily submitted information was “confidential” for purposes
of the trade secrets exemption “if it is of a kind that would customarily not be
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.”184
The court ruled en banc not to overturn the National Parks test because of its
longstanding precedent.185 However, that test was now confined to involuntary
information only.186 And while the court did not state that it was forming a new test
for voluntary information, this was effectively the outcome of the ruling, as courts
in future disputes surrounding FOIA Exemption 4 would have to differentiate
voluntary information, which a government agency apparently only requests, from
that which the agency apparently requires by compulsion.187 This new test was
heavily and quickly criticized in unfavorable articles by legal experts and govern-
ment transparency advocates.188 The most telling criticism of the Critical Mass
decision concerns its impact on government watchdogs, who would find major
Parks test. This was the impetus for the 1992 proceeding under discussion in the main text.
See Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d 871.
178 Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 875.
179 Id. at 878.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See id. at 878.
183 Id. at 879.
184 Id. Note that this language was borrowed from the National Parks ruling, but in that
ruling the requirement was not applied only to voluntarily submitted information. See Nat’l
Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766–67 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
185 Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 880.
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 290 F. Supp.
2d 124, 134 (D.D.C. 2003).
188 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 158; Rocco J. Maffei, The Impact on FOIA after Critical
Mass, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 757 (1993); Scott Raber, Reinventing a Less Vigorous Freedom
of Information Act: The Aftermath of Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 79; G. Branch Taylor, The Decision: A Dangerous
Blow to Exemption 4 Litigation, 2 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 133 (1994).
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categories of previously attainable information falling under the trade secrets
exemption, if the regulated parties or the government agency could claim plausibly
that voluntarily submitted data was not to be released to the public by “custom.”189
Regarding the topic of this Article, Critical Mass is a favorable precedent for the
Federal Reserve, because as discussed above, it has never been the “custom” of the
Fed to release most types of internal documents,190 and it could claim that its
regulated parties furnished the information “voluntarily,” thus allowing an enhanced
presumption of confidentiality for the documents in question.191
The fractured judicial precedents for FOIA Exemption 4 can prohibit the dis-
closure of documents originating in the banking system, as long as the regulated entities
claim that trade secrets are at risk. This raises the important question of who is most
affected by the disclosure of the trade secrets in question. Would the disclosure of
those secrets be truly harmful to the private company, or is withholding the informa-
tion more harmful to the citizen watchdog attempting to assess the quality of the com-
pany’s products and services—or in the cases of banks and their overseers, financial
manipulations that have an impact on the economy? And furthermore, it is difficult
to determine if the Fed member banks furnish information to the leadership voluntarily
or involuntarily, further muddying the applicability of FOIA if Exemption 4 is invoked.
B. FOIA Exemption 8: Legislative History and Court Rulings
Exemption 8 of the FOIA shields information from disclosure if the material is
“contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision
of financial institutions.”192 Courts have identified two core values that Exemption 8
189 See Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors”: The Homeland Security
Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 653 (2003). Similar
concerns were voiced in the dissent to the Critical Mass decision, supplied by future
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who called the new test “slackened” and likely
to inspire agency and business abuse of the phrase “customarily not be released to the
public.” See 975 F.2d at 883 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190 See supra Parts I–II.
191 See Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 880 (stating that, “[s]o long as that information is
provided voluntarily . . . it must be treated as confidential”).
192 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (2012); Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 74 Fed. Reg. 194 (Mar. 19, 2009); OIP
Guidance: President Obama’s FOIA Memorandum and Attorney General Holder’s FOIA
Guidelines: Creating a “New Era of Open Government,” U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 17, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-post-2009-creating-new-era-open-government
[http://perma.cc/A7X3-PQWN]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 146. The FOIA Guide is
the Department of Justice’s official 1,100-page guide explaining the provisions of the FOIA
and Privacy Act and summarizing the case law pertaining to these two statutes. See generally
O’REILLY, supra note 146. O’Reilly’s exhaustive, two-volume, 2,000-page treatise is the
leading nongovernment legal practice guide for litigation under the FOIA and Privacy Act.
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exemplifies. Its primary purpose is to ensure the security of financial institutions,193
which could be threatened by “unwarranted runs on banks” resulting from public dis-
closures of “candid evaluations of financial institutions.”194
Second, Exemption 8 is intended to safeguard the relationship between the
banks and their regulatory agencies.195 Courts concluded that banks would be reluc-
tant to cooperate with agency examiners “if details of the bank examinations were
made freely available to the public and to banking competitors.”196 Additionally,
records of banks no longer in operation are shielded to foster a policy of “frank
cooperation” between bank and agency officials.197
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has declared that Congress has provided “absolute pro-
tection [in Exemption 8] regardless of the circumstances underlying the regulatory
agency’s receipt or preparation of examination, operating or condition reports.”198
The exemption also protects bank examination reports and related documents pre-
pared by state regulatory agencies.199 The exemption’s objectives, the District Court
for the District of Columbia observed, are furthered by non-disclosure of such docu-
ments and information because of the “interconnected” purposes and operations of
federal and state banking authorities.200
Moreover, matters that are “related to” such reports—that is, documents that
“represent the foundation of the examination process, the findings of such an exami-
nation, or its follow-up”—have also been held exempt from disclosure by several
courts.201 Courts also ruled that bank examination reports and memoranda pertaining
to insolvency proceedings,202 cease-and-desist orders following a bank examination,203
and agency reports regarding bank compliance with consumer laws and regulations
were found to also “fall squarely within the exemption.”204
193 Gregory v. FDIC, 631 F.2d 896, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“It is clear from
the legislative history that the exemption was drawn to protect not simply each individual
bank but the integrity of financial institutions as an industry.”).
194 Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 290 F. Supp. 2d 124,
135 (D.D.C. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
195 McKinley v. FDIC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 128, 144 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d sub nom. McKinley
v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 647 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1026 (2012) (mem.).
196 Id. (quoting Consumers Union v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
197 Gregory, 631 F.2d at 899.
198 Id. at 898.
199 Atkinson v. FDIC, No. 79-1113, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17793, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 13,
1980).
200 Id. at *3–4 (providing protection to “communications between federal and state agencies
when the underlying purposes of FOIA were thereby promoted”).
201 Id. at *3.
202 See, e.g., Tripati v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 87-3301, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6249,
at *2–3 (D.D.C. May 23, 1990).
203 Atkinson, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17793, at *6–7.
204 Id. at *6; see also Snoddy v. Hawke, No. 99-WM-1636, 1999 WL 34981534, at *1 (D.
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At the heart of disclosure disputes is the problem that there is no explicit definition
for “financial institutions” in the Act’s plain language, its legislative history, or sub-
sequent amendments.205 Consequently, transparency advocates have criticized congres-
sional lawmakers for allowing the exemption’s definition to remain “overbroad and
superfluous” despite opportunities to do so in revisions to the Act over the years.206
The District Court for the Northern District of California—“following the logic
of these” and other earlier cases in which the D.C. Court broadly interpreted the term
“financial institutions”—held that, “‘financial institutions’ encompasses brokers and
dealers of securities or commodities as well as self-regulatory organizations, such
as the [National Association of Securities Dealers].”207 The District Court for the
District of Columbia has noted the absence of any controlling case law to support “a
distinction between factual versus analytical or deliberative material under [Exemption
8].”208 And the D.C. Circuit concluded that “an entire examination report, not just that
related to the ‘condition of the bank’ may properly be withheld.”209
The court reasoned that non-disclosure of factual and other materials under
Exemption 8 advances its objective “of safeguarding the public appearance of
financial institutions and encouraging cooperation between regulatory agencies and
financial institutions.”210 Some district courts in other circuits have refused to allow the
protection of Exemption 8 to “purely factual material” when analyzing Exemption 8.211
Colo. Dec. 20, 1999) (holding that Exemption 8 protection applied to Citibank’s e-mail, notes,
and other correspondence in a dispute over whether the bank violated industry regulations).
205 FOIA was amended in significant respects in 1974, 1976, 1986, 1996, and 2007. Pub.
L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15).
206 See LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS 2010, at 262 (Harry
Hammitt et al. eds., 2010).
207 Feshbach v. SEC, 5 F. Supp. 2d 774, 781 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see also Pub. Citizen v.
Farm Credit Admin., 938 F.2d 290, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that “institutions providing
credit services . . . are included within the term ‘financial institutions’”); Pub. Inv’rs Arbitra-
tion Bar Ass’n v. SEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 55, 69–70 (D.D.C. 2013) (construing a broad definition
of “financial institution” for Exemption 8), aff’d, 771 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
208 Bloomberg, L.P. v. SEC, 357 F. Supp. 2d 156, 170 (D.D.C. 2004).
209 Atkinson, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7; see also Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.
Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
210 Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: Exemption 8, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/pages/attach
ments/2015/04/21/exemption_8_posted_april_22_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TM4-DC28]
(citing Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, No. 3-90-833, slip op. at 19–20, 23, 26–28,
30, 33 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 20, 1990) (concluding that factual material pertaining to financial
institutions may be withheld)).
211 Pentagon Fed. Credit Union v. NCUA, No. 95-1475-A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22841,
at *11 (E.D. Va. June 7, 1996) (declining to extend Exemption 8 protection to “purely factual
material”); see also Lee v. FDIC, 923 F. Supp. 451, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (likewise denying
protection for information found to be “primarily factual”); cf. Schreiber v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 11 F.3d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (declaring, in context of civil dis-
covery, that “bank examination privilege protects only agency opinions and recommendations
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Lastly, it should be noted that a provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act of 1991 explicitly lists Exemption 8’s applicability with
respect to specific reports prepared pursuant to it.212 That statute requires all federal
banking agency inspectors general to conduct a review and to make a written report
when a deposit insurance fund incurs a material loss with respect to an insured deposi-
tory institution.213 The statute further provides that, with the exception of informa-
tion that would reveal the identity of any customer of the institution, the federal
banking agency “shall disclose any report . . . upon request under [the FOIA]
without excising . . . any information about the insured depository institution under
[Exemption 8].”214
The track record of judicial rulings in Exemption 8 disclosure disputes thus
shows how the courts have systematically strengthened withholding protections by
broadly defining “financial institutions” and broadly framing the exemption. Indeed,
the courts’ sweeping breadth of the exemption has created a virtually unrebuttable
presumption of non-disclosure of information pertaining to government monetary
policy of significant public interest.215 As a result, rulings have left information
seekers unable to prevail, initially, on the agency level and, ultimately, in the courts.
There is a long history of how activist courts have broadly interpreted Exemption
8, consistently refusing to limit the exemption’s judicially framed “broad all-inclusive”
scope,216 despite persuasive arguments to the contrary. In 1976, for instance, Congress
approved the Government in Sunshine Act,217 the federal open-meetings law. This
is a sister statute of the FOIA, in that the Sunshine Act applies to the same adminis-
trative and regulatory federal agencies to which the FOIA (the federal open-records
law) applies.218 In fact, the Sunshine Act shares the same nine exemptions219 as the
FOIA, plus a tenth exception—agency meetings can be closed in the event that the
from disclosure; purely factual information falls outside the privilege”) (non-FOIA case); In re
Subpoena Served upon Comptroller of Currency & the Sec’y of the Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The bank examination privilege,
like the deliberative process privilege, shields from discovery only agency opinions or
recommendations; it does not protect purely factual material.”) (non-FOIA case).
212 12 U.S.C. §1831o(k)(4) (2012).
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
216 Consumers Union of U.S. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
217 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012).
218 Id.
219 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1–9) (2012). The FOIA does not apply to matters that fall under the
categories of (1) classified information and national security, (2) internal agency personnel
information, (3) information exempted by other statutes, (4) trade secrets and other confidential
business information, (5) inter- and intra-agency memoranda, (6) disclosures that constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, (7) law enforcement investigation records, (8) reports
from regulated financial institutions, and (9) geological and geophysical information. 5
U.S.C. § 552b(c).
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subject of the discussion involves litigation to which the government is a party, i.e.,
attorney-client privilege.220
In an attempt to reduce Exemption 8’s sweep, the legislative history of the 1976
Sunshine Act shows that Congress broadly defined “financial institutions.” Two
years later, however, the D.C. Circuit—in apparent contravention of the Sunshine
Act’s congressional intent—declared that Exemption 8 in the context of the FOIA
was “intentionally and unambiguously crafted” in order to have “a particularly broad,
all-inclusive definition.”221 In 1980, the D.C. District Court reiterated, “Congress has
left no room for a narrower interpretation of [E]xemption 8.”222
To bolster this view, in 1986 the D.C. District Court further thwarted FOIA
requestors seeking to penetrate the Federal Reserve’s fortifications against transpar-
ency.223 Requestors had been citing a 1972 District Court ruling when a more progres-
sive and FOIA-friendly D.C. District Court held that national financial exchanges
and dealers and brokers are not “financial institutions” and therefore are not subject
to protection under Exemption 8.224 In response, the district court reversed its own
ruling of fourteen years earlier.225 In the 1986 about-face that took place during the
President Reagan era, the district court ruled that Exemption 8 does indeed apply to
stock exchanges, allowing them to raise Exemption 8 as a bar to disclosure.226 As
another court said: “Exemption 8 was intended by Congress—and has been interpreted
by courts—to be very broadly construed.”227
Along with transparency and FOIA advocates, there were also some jurists
whose opinions clashed with the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit positions. In 2001,
a New Mexico District Court opinion observed in an Exemption 8 opinion that the re-
sult of such sweeping protection of the banking industry is to allow the public little
substantive oversight precisely of monetary oversight.228 Indeed, the opinion declared,
Exemption 8 does not “shield everything banking institutions accumulate . . . [that]
might be reviewed in the process of a bank examination,” adding that “[s]uch a vague
and sweeping definition of what Exemption 8 encompasses can only be regarded as
antithetic to . . . . FOIA’s disclosure requirements.”229 Such voices were not heeded.
220 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10).
221 Consumers Union, 589 F.2d at 533.
222 McCullough v. FDIC, No. 79-1132, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17685, at *2 (D.D.C.
July 28, 1980).
223 See Mermelstein v. SEC, 629 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1986).
224 Id. at 673–75; M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D.D.C. 1972).
225 Mermelstein, 629 F. Supp. at 674–75.
226 Id.
227 Pentagon Fed. Credit Union v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., No. 95-1475, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22841, at *11 (E.D. Va. June 7, 1996).
228 See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 99-615m/KBM, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26121, at *85 (D.N.M. Jan. 29, 2001).
229 Id.
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The chickens came home to roost in 2007. It is indeed ironic that in 2007, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared that if Congress intended a more
narrow interpretation of Exemption 8’s scope, then “it could have easily accom-
plished that by specifying as much.”230 Weeks later, the world’s news media publi-
cized the subprime-mortgage meltdown that caused a near-collapse of the global
financial markets, leaving the Fed along with the rest of the Western world’s central
banks facing a catastrophic recession unseen since the 1930s.231 The Fed and the
bankers who controlled the U.S. financial markets solved the problem by bailing
themselves out with over a trillion dollars of public money.232
In consistently construing Exemption 8 broadly at the cost of keeping the public
in the dark about monetary policy matters of high public interest, the courts were,
in effect, complicit along with the Fed in raising a cloak of secrecy that promulgated
a climate of moral hazard—the hazard being to allow the vast majority of American
investment banks to fleece tens of millions of people without the banks themselves
suffering the financial consequences.
While the intention of FOIA Exemption 8 is to prevent financial panics if
unfavorable information about banks and their regulators gets into the hands of the
public, the statutory text of that exemption is vague enough to allow the courts to
make it an ineffective tool for finding information that may be in the public interest.
Overall, judicial history has given the banking sector a nearly impenetrable pre-
sumption of secrecy.
C. Federal Advisory Committee Act: Legislative History and Court Rulings
It is important to remember that the Fed’s Board of Governors has been deemed
a federal agency and is therefore at least cursorily subjected to executive branch
transparency rules.233 However, the Fed member banks are for-profit operations led
by non-elected business managers and are not parts of the government.234 If the
boards of directors within the Fed banking system advise the Board of Governors
in a structured fashion, they could possibly be deemed “advisory committees” that
interact with the executive branch. The FACA attempts to make this type of group
more transparent, but the problem is determining what exact kind of group qualifies
for the distinction.
Federal advisory committees have been dubbed the “fifth branch of govern-
ment” and they have critics who question their public accountability and their
230 Abrams v. Dep’t of Treasury, 243 F. App’x 4, 6 (5th Cir. 2007).
231 Michael D. Bordo, An Historical Perspective on the Crisis of 2007–2008 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14569, 2008).
232 See supra note 129.
233 Introduction to the Board of Governors, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http://www.stlouis
fed.org/in-plain-english/federal-reserve-board-of-governors [http://perma.cc/95JU-9ACT].
234 Federal Reserve Membership, FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND, https://www.richmondfed
.org/banking/federal_reserve_membership [http://perma.cc/TVH8-ZHGM].
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susceptibility to private interests.235 This raises many questions about government
secrecy and the behavior of advisory committees, both of which are addressed in the
FACA.236 This statute is a potentially powerful, though relatively obscure, member
of the family of government transparency laws. However, citizens and the media
have been largely unable to utilize FACA in attempts to uncover the activities of the
most influential advisory committees, largely due to ambiguous terminology in the
act’s language and the precedents formed during its judicial history.
Advisory committees were uncommon before World War II, but the technical and
administrative requirements of the Cold War era made them much more prevalent.237
The FACA, the nation’s first significant legislation covering such bodies, was passed
by Congress in 1972.238 The act was a “compromise between supporters and detractors
of the advisory committee process” in the federal government, and it allows those
bodies to operate with a certain degree of confidentiality while recognizing the need
for public accountability and transparency.239
FACA defines an “advisory committee” as any committee that has been estab-
lished by the President, or one or more federal agencies, “in the interest of obtaining
advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or other
officers of the federal government.”240 An advisory committee does not include any
committee made up only of permanent officers or employees of the federal govern-
ment.241 Therefore, by definition in the act, an advisory committee includes members
from outside the government, and possibly from private industry.242 This would in-
deed be the case for the boards of directors from member banks that advise the Fed’s
Board of Governors on monetary policy.
FACA recognizes that advisory committees are frequently a beneficial and
useful means of furnishing advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the federal govern-
ment, but that their previous use had not been adequately regulated. Most impor-
tantly, FACA states that the public should be kept informed of the membership and
235 See, e.g., Allan Jonathan Stein, FOIA and FACA: Freedom of Information in the “Fifth
Branch”?, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 passim (1975).
236 Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1–15).
237 See Richard O. Levine, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
217, 219–20 (1973). Since no elected official can possibly possess all the necessary knowledge
on all issues, federal advisory committees have been present throughout American history,
though in varying quantities. The very first may have been a committee recruited by President
George Washington for advice in dealing with the Whiskey Rebellion. See Barbara W.
Tuerkheimer, Veto by Neglect: The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 53,
54 (1975).
238 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15 (2000).
239 See Levine, supra note 237, at 217.
240 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2).
241 Id.
242 Id.
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activities of advisory committees, and that their function should be advisory only.243
This is a problem for transparency at the Fed because advice to the Board of Gover-
nors from the industry leaders is probably not advisory only, as decisions will eventu-
ally have an impact on the member banks’ profitability. In addition, FACA requires
all advisory committee meetings to be open to the public.244 This is another problem
for transparency at the Fed because the Board of Governors has been allowed,
apparently by fiat, to declare that some meetings will be closed to the public.245
While advisory committees come in many forms with representation from
various segments of society, for statutory purposes they basically fall into five cate-
gories. The first four are citizens’ committees that provide advice on general areas
of concern (such as tax policy or environmental issues), scientific or technical com-
mittees that perform and analyze experimental research (often utilized by the Depart-
ments of Defense and Health, Education, and Welfare, among others), committees
that informally assist federal agencies on specific tasks, and research commissions
that create reports for use by the public.246 Of interest for this Article’s discussion
of the Fed is the fifth type of committee, consisting of representatives from an
industry that interacts with, or is regulated by, a particular federal agency.247 These
industry advisory committees have been known to become involved in creating or
overturning the regulations of the very same federal agencies that are mandated to
oversee them, and which (innocently or otherwise) utilize them for policy advice.248
Arguably, the most important reason for the passage of FACA was concern
about the influence of special interest groups. The Act attempted to require “fairly
balanced” points of view among the membership of advisory committees, and also
attempted to prohibit industry-only committees.249 As discussed herein, there are
243 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(1)–(2); see also Levine, supra note 237, at 225.
244 See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and
Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 460–61 (1997). The relevant sections of FACA
referenced are 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2(a), 5(a), 5(b), 10(a)(1) (2000).
245 See Government in the Sunshine Meeting Memorandum, BOARD GOVERNORS FED.
RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/sunshine.htm [http://
perma.cc/S7MK-QY3X].
246 See Levine, supra note 237, at 217–18. The five categories of advisory committees are
based upon a typology proposed by Levine. See also Benjamin W. Cramer, The Power of
Secrecy and the Secrecy of Power: FACA and the National Energy Policy Development Group,
13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 183, 198–99 (2008).
247 Levine, supra note 237, at 218.
248 See id. An early case of controversial advisory committee behavior, and suspicions of
conflicts of interest, was the recruitment of chemical manufacturing industry insiders for an
EPA committee investigating the air pollution caused by that same industry. See Robert W.
Dietsch, The Invisible Bureaucracy, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 20, 1971, at 19, 19. Within
administrative law, this concern is embodied in “capture theory,” which builds upon the
supposition that federal agencies will become unduly influenced by the industries that they
regulate. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION vii–xii, 372–94 (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1980).
249 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5(b)(2), 5(c) (2000). These provisions of FACA have not been
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banking industry-exclusive groups advising the Fed.250 Regardless of its subsequent
enforcement and legislative history, FACA mandated several reforms in the unfet-
tered use of advisory committees by regulating their formation and operations.251
Although FACA is uncommonly utilized by opponents of government secrecy, it
has potential as a powerful legal and legislative weapon in enforcing the transparency
of government—and its advisors. FACA applies directly to the advisory committees
themselves, providing a potentially powerful tool for Congressional oversight.252 But
this power has possibly been thwarted by court precedent regarding the meaning of
the statutory language.
Enforcement of FACA is often thwarted by government agencies utilizing the
special exemptions in the more publicly understood (and popular) FOIA, in order
to avoid making the records of advisory meetings public.253 Over time, the exact
definition of what actually is an advisory committee, to be subject to the require-
ments of FACA, has become a matter of dispute in the courts. In particular, FOIA
Exemption 5, which allows the withholding of “inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-
dums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the [former] agency,”254 has been applied frequently in FACA
disputes.255 Several cases in the early history of FACA, including one brought by
consumer advocate Ralph Nader, challenged the use of FOIA Exemption 5 in
government efforts to keep advisory committee meeting records secret.256 In all of
the relevant precedents on this question, the courts ruled that the FOIA exemption
cannot be invoked in that fashion.257 Meanwhile, the direct application of FACA to
advisory committees, and not just to the agencies that utilize them, was confirmed
by the D.C. Circuit Court in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc.
subjected to strong enforcement. See also Croley & Funk, supra note 244, at 462–64; Levine,
supra note 237, at 219–35.
250 Federal Advisory Council, supra note 100.
251 See Levine, supra note 237, at 234–35.
252 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a) (2000) (The act “shall apply to each advisory committee except
to the extent that any Act of Congress establishing any such advisory committee specifically
provides otherwise”).
253 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 237, at 64–66. For mathematical evidence of the far more
prevalent use of FOIA, as opposed to FACA, by government watchdogs, see Cramer, supra
note 246, at 200 & n.80.
254 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012).
255 See, e.g., Nader v. Dunlop, 370 F. Supp. 177, 180 (D.D.C. 1973).
256 Id. at 178.
257 Three of the most noteworthy cases are Aviation Consumer Action Project v. Washburn,
535 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1976), concerning a consumer advocacy group’s efforts to access
records of meetings held by the Travel Advisory Board; Gates v. Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp.
797 (D.D.C. 1973), concerning citizen requests for the Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services to conduct open meetings; and Nader, 370 F. Supp. 177, in which
Ralph Nader challenged a prohibition of public attendance at meetings of the Cost of Living
Council. See generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 237, at 64–66.
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v. Clinton,258 a case brought against First Lady Hillary Clinton and her use of advisory
committees while formulating national health care policy in the 1990s.259
Some legal definitions and requirements within FACA have been challenged by the
agencies subjected to citizen or media requests for information, resulting in the need
for judicial review of portions of the act.260 Washington Legal Foundation v. U.S.
Department of Justice261 was a noteworthy dispute over the Justice Department’s use
of advisory committees in efforts to evaluate potential federal judges—such groups
are often suspected of exercising ideological biases.262 The Justice Department re-
sisted disclosing information about these committees by claiming that to do so would
violate the Separation of Powers clause of the U.S. Constitution.263 The D.C. District
Court ruled that the committee in question was indeed an advisory committee under
FACA, but applying the FACA open-meetings and open-records requirements to
that committee would be unconstitutional, because to do so would allow Congress
to interfere with the President’s ability to appoint judges, thus violating separation of
powers.264 The case also raised questions about who exactly can bring a FACA suit
against an advisory committee, with the Justice Department questioning the legality
of private citizens and advocacy groups mounting such legal challenges.265
The Supreme Court added much-needed definition to the Washington Legal
ruling in a related case brought by the group Public Citizen, challenging the secrecy
of the same judicial recruitment committees.266 While not overturning the ruling of
unconstitutionality (specifically regarding the Justice Department), in the Public
Citizen case the Supreme Court found that under FACA, public interest groups do
indeed have standing to bring suit against the secrecy of advisory committees.267 Of
258 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff’g 813 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1993).
259 Id. at 900–02. This case set the precedent that FACA applies directly to advisory
committees. However, the ultimate result of this case was the ruling that Hillary Clinton’s
National Health Care Task Force was not in actuality an advisory committee subject to
FACA. Id. at 915–16.
260 See generally Croley & Funk, supra note 244, at 513–26.
261 691 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
491 U.S. 440 (1989). The Department of Justice’s claim of unconstitutionality, citing the
separation of powers doctrine, was purportedly compelling to the court because FACA
requirements were framed by the defendants as an attempt by Congress to unduly regulate
the activities of the executive branch. Id. at 491–92.
262 Id. at 484–85.
263 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Washington Legal Found., 691 F. Supp. at 491.
264 Washington Legal Found., 691 F. Supp. at 496.
265 Id. at 485–86. The ruling cites a quantity of then-recent cases that raise this question,
but no potential answer is discussed.
266 See Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 443.
267 Id. at 450–51; see 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (2000). Public Citizen was founded by Ralph
Nader to represent consumer interests in the federal government. For an analysis of this case,
see Mary Kathryn Palladino, Ensuring Coverage, Balance, Openness and Ethical Conduct
for Advisory Committee Members Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 ADMIN. L.J.
231, 239–50 (1991).
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special interest for this Article’s arguments is a case brought by another citizens’
group against an advisory committee that was advising the President on federal
food-assistance programs. In National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Commit-
tee of the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control,268 the advisory com-
mittee in question was believed by activists to be made up entirely of corporate
executives, with no representation from public interest advocates or the beneficiaries
of government assistance.269 The court confirmed that the citizens’ group had standing
to sue under FACA.270 For purposes of the argument in this Article, this precedent
at least gives citizen watchdogs standing to sue for access to the meetings of any
group that is advising the Fed, if such a group can be defined as an “advisory
committee” under FACA.271
Though the above cases clarified who can sue under FACA, some other cases
have confirmed who exactly can be sued under the act.272 Recall that the require-
ments of FACA can be applied directly to the advisory committees themselves.273
However, whether a citizen request for information should be directed toward the
advisory committee in question, or to the agency utilizing it, was left unclear in the
act’s text. The pitfalls of this lack of clarity were illustrated in a court dispute
involving the Federal Highway Administration, which resulted in a ruling that
FACA more directly regulates the agency rather than the committee, and the agency
is responsible for legal challenges from citizens.274 This ruling was affirmed in a
case challenging the use of members of the American Bar Association in a commit-
tee advising the Department of Justice, in which a District Court ruled, “[i]f the Act
regulates the government’s use of the advisory committee and not the committee
itself, it follows that the proper defendant in a suit brought to enforce the Act is the
government, not the advisory committee ‘utilized’ by the government.”275
The efforts of FACA’s crafters to promote the evenhandedness (or to control
conflicts of interest) in an advisory committee’s policy recommendations have also
been the source of legal challenges, because the language about what constitutes
268 557 F. Supp 524 (D.D.C. 1983).
269 Id. at 528.
270 Id. at 527. Despite the favorable ruling on standing, the plaintiffs in this case were still
unable to make use of FACA’s disclosure provisions because the court also ruled that the
advisory committee in question was not found to violate the act’s requirements for a “fairly
balanced” viewpoint. Id. at 530; see also 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2) (2000).
271 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2).
272 See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
273 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a).
274 Ctr. for Auto Safety, 580 F.2d at 693–95.
275 Wash. Legal Found. v. Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary, 648 F.
Supp. 1353, 1359 (D.D.C. 1986). This ruling affirms 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (2000). The two
suits brought by Washington Legal Foundation described here were part of a lengthy effort
by that group to reduce the secrecy of the U.S. Department of Justice, a goal that the group
had pursued since 1977.
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such evenhandedness is insufficiently clear in the act.276 Unfortunately the courts
have not clarified this issue, resulting in a series of mixed rulings on the matter of
“evenhanded” or “balanced” committees.277 For example, in a case brought by Public
Citizen against the Department of Health and Human Services, the D.C. District
Court ruled that it would be impractical for the judiciary “to examine the background
of every person on the committee to determine whether anyone already represents the
interests of the person or group challenging the committee’s composition.”278
Another source of legal difficulty is the fact that FACA provides no remedies
for its own violation.279 If a committee is found to be an advisory committee that is
subject to the requirements of FACA, and it does not fulfill all of those requirements
(such as opening its meetings or making its records available to the public), then the
act does not provide any punishments for the offending committee or the agency that
utilized it, nor any remedies for the interested citizen.280 Thus, the courts have had
to formulate remedies, or more commonly, have tried to avoid doing so.281
In a case concerning a committee advising the President on the use of private
contractors in national forests, a district court tried to avoid the issue of judicial
remedies by ruling that “[t]his court has . . . rejected the opportunities offered by
defendants to engage in similar [to what Congress should have done] creative
statutory construction and interpretation.”282 The Eleventh Circuit formulated a
potentially useful remedy in a case regarding an advisory committee that recom-
mended endangered species status for the Alabama sturgeon.283 In effect, the policy
that was enacted, based on the committee’s recommendation, was invalidated.284
276 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5(b)(2)–(3) (2000). Section 5(b)(2) uses the term “fairly balanced,”
and section 5(b)(3) states that an advisory committee should not be “inappropriately influenced”
by “any special interest.” Id. For ease of discussion, the term “evenhandedness” is used here
to represent these concepts.
277 A noteworthy case that is not discussed infra is Public Citizen v. National Advisory
Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d. 419, 419–20, 424–26 (D.C. Cir.
1989), in which the Circuit Court found that the advisory committee in question did not vio-
late the “fairly balanced” provision of FACA, id. at 424–26.
278 Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 795 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (D.D.C.
1992).
279 Croley & Funk, supra note 244, at 522.
280 Id. at 524.
281 See id. The concerns about judicial infringement are typically influenced by the
separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
282 N.W. Forest Res. Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009, 1014 (D.D.C. 1994). The ruling
in this case was that the advisory committee was indeed subject to FACA, and that its
activities should be made public, but the responsibility for the remedy to these problems was
passed to the executive branch. Id. at 1014–15.
283 See Ala.–Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dep’t of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1994),
aff’g No. 93-AR-2322-S, 1993 WL 646410, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 1993).
284 Id. at 1105. The plaintiffs were a group of businesses and private organizations who
opposed the designation of the Alabama sturgeon (which inhabits rivers in Alabama and
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However, no useful precedent was set because this strategy has not been used
outside of the Eleventh Circuit. Otherwise the courts have generally avoided the
issue of FACA remedies. This approach can be seen in Seattle Audubon Society v.
Lyons,285 a case in which the agency utilizing the illegally secret (under FACA) ad-
visory committee was not instructed to undo anything it had done based on that
committee’s recommendations.286
This judicial history has resulted in little clarification of the many vague aspects
of the FACA, which has not made it easy for concerned citizens to obtain official in-
formation about the activities, recommendations, or membership of groups made up
of representatives from private industry that advise the executive branch, including
the Fed’s Board of Governors, which is the only segment of the Fed that has been
acknowledged as subject to at least some Executive Branch transparency rules.
CONCLUSION
The American economy crashed in 2007, but despite a large amount of investi-
gative reports, books, and feature films about the practices of the Federal Reserve
as the crisis developed, it is still difficult to decipher the Fed’s influence on what
happened.287 Perhaps more importantly, it will also be difficult to determine whether
the nation’s monetary policy decision-makers have changed any of the practices that
led to the crisis and if anything is being done to prevent another one. As this Article
has demonstrated, the Fed’s internal operations are obscured by a peculiar quasi-
public legal structure that insulates it from the checks and balances process as typically
projected toward the executive branch; court precedents built upon an unrebuttable
presumption that the Fed’s practices should remain secretive; an ongoing assumption
that the release of too much government-held information on monetary policy (particu-
larly if it indicates structural weaknesses) can lead to a panic; and the de facto secrecy
Mississippi) as an endangered species, as per the recommendation of the advisory committee.
Id. at 1104–05. The ruling invalidated the endangered species designation, because the ad-
visory committee was found to have violated the open meetings provisions of FACA. Id. at
1106–07. The result was the loss of endangered species protection for the Alabama sturgeon,
because of the secrecy of the committee that had deemed the fish worthy of protection. See
Croley & Funk, supra note 244, at 524–25. See generally Ray Vaughan, State of Extinction: The
Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart
Protection for Rare Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569 (1995).
285 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
286 Id. 1309–10. In this case the court ruled that injunctive relief would be inappropriate
because the advisory committee’s report had been circulated through agency channels during
a period of public comment collection. Id. In effect, the court avoided formulating a remedy
for the illegal secrecy of the advisory committee due to this technicality.
287 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html.
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that comes with the sheer complexity of monetary policy. In short, American trans-
parency statutes are unable to penetrate the obscure inner workings of the Fed.
As a result, citizens and journalists, not to mention the other branches of the
American government, have been unable to oversee the Fed’s monetary policy
decisions proactively or (with the exception of announcements about interest rates)
even a short time after decisions are made. Furthermore, deeper regulatory/deregulatory
decisions by the Fed are undetectable until after financial and economic problems
ensue. During Congressional hearings on the Fed’s role in the 2007 collapse, former
Chair of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, answered pointed questions in the vague and
meandering fashion of someone who did not expect his decisions to be analyzed by
others.288 While serving as Chair, Greenspan heavily favored deregulation of the
financial services industry, regularly remarking that free markets imposed discipline
better than government regulators.289 Critics charged that Greenspan’s focus on low
interest rates in the early 2000s encouraged the housing bubble and subprime
mortgage market collapse that contributed directly to the financial crisis starting in
2007, enabling traders to focus on short-term profits while gambling with other
people’s money.290 When asked by Senator Henry Waxman (D-CA) during a Con-
gressional hearing if his ideology led him into unwise decisions, Greenspan con-
ceded, “Yes, I’ve found a flaw [in that ideology]. I don’t know how significant or
permanent it is. But I’ve been very distressed by that fact.”291 When Waxman later
asked if he had been wrong, Greenspan semi-reluctantly answered “partially.”292
Greenspan’s (and for that matter, Waxman’s) conception of Fed policy as “ideol-
ogy” is one reason for greater transparency of the Fed’s operations, not less. Leaders
who make decisions based on ideology are less likely to acknowledge the potential
benefits of public participation. Meanwhile, the complexity of monetary policy and
the financial industry indicates that watchdogs and journalists should have access
to not less but more information that they can then interpret for the general public,
because all Americans are eventually impacted by the state of the economy, which
is in turn impacted by policy decisions at the Federal Reserve.
The piecemeal transparency statutes that have been directed specifically at the
Fed, such as the Federal Banking Agency Audit Act, have done little to allow citizens,
journalists, or Congress to gain more than scattered information about decision-
making in monetary policy, and practically nothing about the reasons for Fed decisions
while they are being made.293 The nation’s most potentially powerful transparency
statutes, the FOIA and the FACA, are riddled with vague terminology that might
allow flexibility in some contexts, but have been interpreted by the courts to allow
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 See supra Part II.
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secrecy, of a type displayed in few other industries, across the banking sector and
its regulators.294
Americans might still be learning about the details of the crash of 2007–2008,
but learning about the Federal Reserve System’s influence on the crisis and whether
it could have done anything to prevent it has been made all but impossible without
significant reforms to existing transparency laws or the passage of new ones that are
directed at the deepest decision-making processes at the Fed. Res ipsa loquitur the
Fed has gained a largely unrebuttable presumption of secrecy from the courts, allow-
ing it to hide information, about monetary policy and its effects on the American and
international economies, that is of crucial public interest.
294 See supra Part III.
